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Misrepresentation, Confusion and The Average Consumer: To What Extent Are The 
Tests for Passing Off and A Likelihood of Confusion Within Trade Mark Law 
Identical? 
By Alice Blythe, School of Law, University of Bolton 
Introduction 
The respective tests for determining the existence of passing off or a trade mark infringement 
based on a likelihood of confusion contain key conceptual differences.  In essence passing off 
involves the classic trinity of misrepresentation, goodwill and damage the classic example 
being where a trader misrepresents the goods he sells as though they were those of another, 
possibly by imitating the packaging and trade marks associated with this other trader, in order 
to achieve customer sales based on the goodwill of another and thereby causing damage to it.  
A basic trade mark infringement  based upon the confusion rationale would be where the 
defendant sells goods under a sign that is identical or similar to a registered trade mark, the 
goods being identical or similar those for which the mark is registered and where the average 
consumer encountering those goods there exists a likelihood of confusion whereby the 
consumer mistakenly thinks that the defendant’s goods are the claimant’s goods or 
mistakenly believe that there exists an economic link between the two undertakings.  Until 
fairly recently the courts appear to have adopted the view that in essence these two legal tests 
amounted to the same thing as though they were two ways of asking the same question 
thereby arriving at the same conclusion.  This approach seems to have been originally 
endorsed by Jacob L.J. in Reed Executive v. Reed Business Information1 a case in which there 
were actions for both trade mark infringement and passing off involving the mark ‘REED’ for 
                                                          
1 Reed Executive plc v. Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] EWHC (Civ) 159 
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recruitment activities. Reed Business Information published specialist magazines where jobs 
for that sector would be advertised and Reed Employment ran an employment agency.  Both 
parties to the dispute utilised the internet and had their own websites.  In reaching his 
decision, Jacob L.J. focussed heavily on the similarities between the respective tests and 
emphasised that at key points they were essentially the same.   
However, in a line of recent cases, this stance has been cast into doubt.  Starting with the 
judgement of Lewison L.J. in Interflora v. Marks & Spencer Flowers Direct2, and continuing 
in the initial proceedings in Cosmetic Warriors v. Amazon3 (where matters concerning the 
admissibility of evidence to support an action for passing off were decided) and most recently 
in Moroccanoil Israel v. Aldi Stores4, Jacob L.J.’s reasoning has been repeatedly called into 
question.  It seems therefore that it is now time to re-visit this area and so this article aims to 
re-examine both legal tests in order to ascertain the existence and extent of any overlap 
before evaluating possible implications for future development.   
 
The Two Legal Tests 
The law of passing off is one of the economic torts and is a means by which all traders can 
seek legal redress to protect the goodwill or reputation of their business from the 
misrepresentations made by other traders irrespective of whether or not the name under 
which they trade is a registered trade mark.  The modern definition of  the tort was given by 
                                                          
2 Interflora v. Marks & Spencer [2013] F.S.R. 21 
3 Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v. Amazon.co.uk. Ltd. [2013] EWHC 2470 (Ch) 
4 Moroccanoil Israel Ltd. v. Aldi Stores Ltd. [2014] EWHC 1686 
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Lord Diplock in Warnick (Erven) v. Townend and Sons Ltd.5, the ‘Advocaat’ case.  Carty 
regards that, 
“For Lord Diplock five characteristics provide the essence of the tort: a misrepresentation; 
made by a trader in the course of trade; to his prospective customers; calculated to injure the 
business or goodwill of another; and which does so injure or probably will do so.”6   
In order to try and simplify this, the courts have adopted the so-called classic trinity approach 
whereby they define the tort by reference to three concepts; misrepresentation, goodwill and 
damage.   
“All three concepts of the classic trinity link together and shape each other: none are free –
standing. The misrepresentation must be ‘calculated to injure’ the claimant’s goodwill and 
cause or be probable to cause such damage.  It is the reliance on the misrepresentation which 
is the cement between the three elements of this trinity.”7   
 
The most common type of passing off involves the defendant selling goods that purport to be 
those of the claimant.  The most simplistic way for the defendant to achieve this is to copy 
the packaging and trade marks of the claimant’s goods and affix these to their own goods.  In 
such instances the damage suffered by the claimant is fairly obvious, that his business will 
suffer as customers purchase goods merely purporting to be those of the claimant resulting in 
a loss of sales revenue to the claimant.  However, that is not all, the claimant may suffer 
future loss of sales as these imposter goods may not be of the same quality that the claimant 
usually sells and that customers expect therefore if the customers feel dissatisfied with the 
                                                          
5 Erven Warnink BV v. J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd. [1979] A.C. 731 
6 Carty, H., An Analysis of The Economic Torts, 2nd Edition, (2010), OUP, at p. 229 
7 Ibid. at p.30 
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goods they will mistakenly attribute that to the claimant and avoid all goods bearing their 
name in future.  In such instances the goodwill and reputation of a business that may have 
taken many years to create may be destroyed in a fairly short period of time.  The reliance 
placed by consumers upon the misrepresentation is the binding force between the three key 
elements of passing off whilst in trade mark law the likelihood of consumers being confused 
as to trade origin of the goods is central to infringement.  It is this element which appears so 
very similar between the two that is the source from which the other similarities stem and that 
has led to the arguments for passing off and trade mark infringement to be treated as though 
they are two sides of the same coin.  Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/95 sets out the provisions 
which form the basis for trade mark infringement based on the confusion rationale.   
 
“Article 5- Rights conferred by a trade mark 
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein.  The 
proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from 
using in the course of trade: 
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services 
which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered. 
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and 
the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and 
the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the 
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likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association between the sign 
and the trade mark.”8 
Given the fact that many businesses today register the signs under which they trade as trade 
marks there are many instances where a claimant will bring actions for both passing off and 
trade mark infringement in the same proceedings perhaps further helping to create the 
conditions in which their similarities have been over emphasised.   
 
A substantial proportion of the public and the average consumer 
Central to both trade mark infringement and passing off is the desire to prevent consumers 
from being confused or misled into believing that the defendant’s goods are those of the 
claimant.  It is this element of consumer confusion and of the public being misled that is the 
strongest similarity between the two doctrines and the point from which stems the argument 
that they are essentially the same.  However, passing off is aimed at safeguarding business 
goodwill whilst trade mark law is aimed at enforcing the proprietor’s right to exclusive use of 
his mark.  This element of trade mark law is crucial for ensuring that the trade mark will 
signal to consumers that the goods originate from the proprietor.  It also enables the mark to 
act as a guarantee of quality to consumers.  Such a guarantee is not absolute, for a 
manufacturer is at liberty to alter the quality of his goods as he wishes, but the fact that the 
resulting losses or gains will accrue to him alone means that it is he who undertakes the risk.  
As Laddie J. once stated in Arsenal v. Reed9 the trade mark signals to consumers that the 
goods are of a quality that the proprietor is content to distribute under his banner.  Without 
                                                          
8 Article 5 Directive 2008/95 
9 Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Reed (No.1) [2001] 2 C.M.L.R. 23 
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exclusivity of use in a mark this would not be able to happen.  Passing off seeks to protect 
business goodwill which is the trading reputation of the economic undertaking proclaimed by 
the sign.  Once again there is a strong similarity with trade mark law.  The business goodwill 
proclaimed by the sign will be perceived by consumers in a very similar way to that which 
Laddie J. described for trade marks because once again consumers will associate certain 
standards or quality with that sign, either based on past experiences or the business 
reputation, the goodwill that they have heard about.  As long as this sign is able when viewed 
by consumers to signal that one undertaking then their trading standards, business practices 
and product quality will accrue to them and no other and also not be affected by their rivals’ 
practices.  For a rival may decide to lower his standards but as long as customers do not 
confuse his goods with those of other traders no one is harmed by this act.  It is when the sign 
no longer signals the claimant’s standards that the problems arise.  It is for this reason that 
counterfeit goods are loathed by trade mark proprietors because they have no control over the 
quality of the goods.10  If shoddily made counterfeit goods are bought by customers who do 
not realise that they have bought a fake, and they have a bad experience then this will be 
linked to the real owner of the sign and the blame mistakenly laid at his door.  Therefore it is 
crucial that consumers make the right link between the marks and the signs and the 
companies they represent.  This is a strong element in both doctrines and what led to Jacob 
LJ’s reasoning in Reed Executive v Reed Business Information.   
“Next the ordinary consumer test.  The ECJ actually uses the phrase ‘average consumer’.  
The notion here is conceptually different from the “substantial proportion of the public” test 
applied in passing off(see e.g. Neutrogena Corp. v. Golden Ltd.) The ‘average consumer’ is a 
notional individual whereas the substantial proportion test involves a statistical assessment, 
                                                          
10 Sugden, D., Grey Markets: Prevention, Detection and Litigation, (2009), OUP p.6-7 
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necessarily crude.  But in the end I think they come to the same thing.  For if a ‘substantial 
proportion’ of the relevant consumers are likely to be confused, so will the notional average 
consumer and vice versa.  Whichever approach one uses, one is essentially doing the same 
thing- forming an overall (‘global’) assessment as to whether there is likely to be significant 
consumer confusion.”11   
 
One important distinction between these two doctrines is the wording concerning who has to 
be misled or likely to be confused by the defendant’s use of a sign, passing off law talks 
about a significant proportion of the public whilst trade mark law talks of the average 
consumer.  This begs the question, who are these people?  Within passing off law the 
substantial proportion of the public is just that.  However, the court will take account of the 
circumstances and make allowances so that it is a substantial proportion of the public who is 
buying that particular product.  For example in Kimberly Clarke v. Fort Sterling12 the product 
concerned was toilet paper.  The defendant’s had produced a promotional wrapper to the 
effect that they were so certain that the customer would approve of their toilet paper that if 
they were unhappy they would exchange it for Andrex ( the market leader).  The problem 
was that in an average supermarket shop lasting approximately 40 minutes customers only 
allotted roughly 10 seconds to choosing something as mundane as toilet paper and in effect 
would just read the word Andrex on the packet and throw the item into their trolley not 
realising their mistake until much later.  In reality consumers pay more attention when buying 
a car than when purchasing toilet paper and therefore the legal test reflects this.  In trade mark 
                                                          
11 Reed Executive Plc v. Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] EWHC (Civ) 159 at paragraph 82 
12 Kimberly Clark Ltd. v. Fort Sterling Ltd. [1997] F.S.R. 877 
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law the average consumer is someone who is ‘reasonably well informed and circumspect’13.  
Once again if the item is specialist, niche products sold to a niche market then the average 
consumer used here would be an average consumer of that niche market.  However, does it 
follow that these two tests involving these two sets of people will always lead to the same 
result?  Lewison L.J. in Interflora v. Marks & Spencer Flowers Direct addressed this. 
“I agree entirely that the average consumer (in trade mark infringement) is conceptually 
different from the substantial proportion of the public test (passing off).  What I find difficult 
to accept is that they come to the same thing.  If most consumers are not confused, how can it 
be said that the average consumer is?  I do not think that this particular paragraph of Jacob 
L.J.’s judgement is part of the ratio of the case and, with the greatest of respect, despite Jacob 
L.J.’s vast experience of such cases I question it.  In some cases the result will no doubt be 
the same however, the question is approached; but I do not think that it is inevitable.”14 
 
Lewison’s argument was returned to during the initial proceedings between Cosmetic 
Warriors v. Amazon15 when before Mr. Justice Martin Q.C. the claimants were allowed to 
amend their proceedings to include a passing off claim but were refused the permission they 
sought to conduct and adduce a survey.  Cosmetic Warriors own the trade mark ‘Lush’ for 
cosmetics and claim to be the inventor of the bath bomb, a product with which their brand is 
heavily associated.  Amazon had purchased the word ‘lush’ as an adword meaning that 
whenever the word lush was used as a keyword in a Google search engine there would appear 
a sponsored link that would direct internet shoppers to the Amazon website where they could 
                                                          
13 Sabel BV v. Puma AG Rudolf Dassler Sport (C-251-95) 
14 Interflora v. Marks & Spencer plc. [2013] F.S.R. 21 at paragraph 34. 
15 Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v. Amazon.co.uk. Ltd. [2013] EWHC 2470 (Ch) 
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purchase bath bombs and other cosmetic/ beauty products.  Amazon also have their own 
internal search engine within their own website where consumers can enter a keyword to 
direct them to the relevant pages of products.  If a customer entered the word lush into this 
internal Amazon search engine they were directed to a page listing bath bombs and other 
goods which were made by rivals to Lush Cosmetics because no Lush products were sold via 
Amazon and crucially Amazon did not display a ‘no results found’ page but instead directed 
customers to alternative products.  Cosmetic Warriors sought proceedings for both trade mark 
infringement and passing off.  Whilst the arguments surrounding the use of trade marks as 
adwords is a topic beyond the scope of this article, what is interesting to note is that Cosmetic 
Warriors felt the need to issue proceedings in both and that this took place against the 
backdrop of the opposing views of Jacob L.J. and Lewison L.J. outlined above.  Mr. Justice 
Martin Q.C. regarded this point of law as being in a state of flux and therefore was fully 
prepared to envision the possibility that the law would eventually be held to be that the tests 
for trade mark infringement on the one hand and passing off on the other are not only 
conceptually different but capable of leading to different results.  It is for this reason that he 
had sympathy with the claimants seeking to be protected under both heads should the need 
arise.  Surely given the different rationales upon which they are based this is the correct 
approach to adopt for although there are points at which they share strong similarities this 
ought not to blind us to their differences and that whilst in most cases the end outcome will 
be the same it is not always inevitable.   
 
Deception and Confusion in a Wider Sense 
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Within trade mark law under article 5(1)(a) where the defendant’s sign, the trade mark and 
the goods of both parties are identical, the likelihood of confusion seems to be automatically 
presumed.  In such instances the only main recourse of defendants has been to plead that the 
use of the sign was not in the course of trade and therefore outside of the scope of the 
provision.  Under article 5(1)(b) where there are differences between the defendant’s sign and 
the trade mark and or the goods or services concerned, the likelihood of confusion is not 
automatic and therefore the test has been examined by the judiciary in greater depth.  
Therefore it is from examining these judgements that one can most clearly see the judicial 
reasoning within trade mark law which led to an overlap with the tort of passing off.  One of 
the problems noted by Hacon J. in Moroccanoil Ltd. v. Aldi Stores Ltd.16, is the loose use of 
language.  Hacon J. views the word ‘confusion’ as being a “problem term”.  The wording has 
its origins in the Trade Marks Act 1938 and is currently found in section 10 of the Trade 
Marks Act 1994 which is the provision by which article 5 of Directive 2008/95 is transposed 
into U.K. law.  Hacon J. views the root cause as being the phrase “deceive or cause 
confusion” which was found in the 1938 Act and that this led to a mistaken supposition 
within passing off that proof of confusion is an acceptable substitute for proof of deception.  
He notes that deception pre-supposes the existence of a misrepresentation whilst confusion 
does not.  This distinction is crucial but unfortunately it has not always been clearly 
maintained as “the law reports are full of cases in which misrepresentation is discussed in 
terms of whether or not there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.”17  This 
is hardly surprising considering that many claimants bring actions for both trade mark 
infringement and passing off in the same proceedings.  Yet for passing off there has to be 
deception whilst for trade mark infringement a likelihood of confusion will suffice.   
                                                          
16 Moroccanoil Israel Ltd. v. Aldi Stores Ltd. [2014] EWHC 1686 at paragraph 9 
17 Ibid. at paragraph 9. 
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Under trade mark law the likelihood of confusion is assessed by the so-called global 
appreciation approach which was set out by the CJEU in Sabel v. Puma18.  The facts were 
that a sports clothing manufacturer wanted to register the mark ‘SABEL’ in a lozenge shape 
underneath a picture of a bounding cheetah.  The famous sportswear brand Puma objected 
due to its similarity with their famous mark of a bounding puma and thought there would be a 
risk of confusion on the part of the public.  The CJEU were faced with the issue of how to 
assess the similarity between the two devices.  Should they assess the marks as a whole or 
focus on their distinctive and dominant components?  Plus as one of the marks contained a 
word element was this enough to differentiate it from the one which was purely pictorial?  
Their answer to this was to hold that the two marks would be assessed globally taking into 
account all relevant factors.  The marks were viewed as a whole whilst bearing in mind their 
distinctive and dominant components and that a greater degree of similarity between the two 
marks would off-set a greater degree of dissimilarity between the goods and vice versa.  They 
also held that the greater the reputation of the mark (i.e. the more famous it is) the greater 
would be the likelihood of confusion and so a stronger mark could be protected against a 
wider range of goods.  Crucially in Sabel v. Puma the court also ruled on the interpretation of 
the provision “including a likelihood of association” and did so by upholding the reasoning of 
Laddie J. in Wagamama v. City Centre Restaurants19.  In this case when faced with 
infringement proceedings concerning the name ‘Rajamama’ for an Indian restaurant by the 
holders of the mark ‘Wagamama’ for a chain of Chinese restaurants Laddie J. thought that 
not only was there a likelihood of confusion due to their aural similarity and the fact that 
                                                          
18 Sabel BV v. Puma AG Rudolf Dassler Sport (C-251/95)  
19 Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants Plc [1995] F.S.R. 713 
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often recommendations for restaurants are passed around by word of mouth, but that there 
was a risk that diners familiar with the mark ‘Wagamama’ would assume that they had 
branched out into Indian cuisine under a sister trade mark Rajamama.  This reasoning took 
account of the reality of modern consumers being savvy about the economic links between 
undertakings and that due to this there may be occasions where consumers will be confused 
by similar marks into a belief that the undertakings are linked, for example that they are sister 
companies, part of a franchise or operate under a licence agreement.  Moroccanoil Israel Ltd. 
v. Aldi Stores Ltd.20 provides a classic example of this.  The claimant a manufacturer and 
global purveyor of hair products, the most successful being a hair oil marketed under the 
name ‘Moroccanoil’ issued proceedings against the well-known supermarket Aldi for its 
marketing in the U.K. of a hair oil under the name ‘Miracle Oil’.  Moroccanoil claimed that 
sales by Aldi of Miracle Oil constituted passing off due to the name and get-up of ‘Miracle 
Oil’ being so similar to that of Moroccanoil that a substantial number of consumers would 
wither mistake Miracle Oil for Moroccanoil or assume that there existed a trade connection 
between the two in the form of sharing a common manufacturer or being produced under 
licence from Moroccanoil.  This is similar to the meaning given to a likelihood of association 
within trade mark infringement under article 5(1)(b) Directive 2008/95.  It echoes the 
reasoning set out by Laddie J in Wagamama v. City Centre Restaurants21 because it is aimed 
at preventing the same kind of damage, the damage that can be inflicted upon another trader 
in circumstances where the public recognise that the two signs are different but regard them 
as being economically linked undertakings so that once again the sign does not signal one 
undertaking and its standards to the public.  Whilst it is important to remember that trade 
mark law is concerned with confusion and passing off law with misrepresentation, the way in 
                                                          
20 Moroccanoil Israel Ltd. v. Aldi Stores Ltd. [2014] EWHC 1686 
21 Wagamama Ltd v. City Centre Restaurants Plc [1995] F.S.R. 713 
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which the confusion can arise and the misrepresentation be manifested can be the same.  This 
stems from consumers being familiar with companies branching out into neighbouring 
markets and of large scale enterprises trading under an assortment of names and marks.  The 
legal actions may be different, but the factual circumstances which give rise to them may be 
identical.  In this way the reasoning employed when assessing the existence of a 
misrepresentation in a wider sense appears similar to that employed when assessing the 
likelihood of confusion in a wider sense.  This was illustrated by Hacon J. in Moroccanoil 
Israel Ltd. v. Aldi Stores Ltd. where he made the distinction between the public merely 
wondering if the products were the same as opposed to them being actually misled.   
“I should be clear, though, that what matters is whether there was a misrepresentation.  In this 
case that means whether the public would assume, because of the get-up and name Miracle 
Oil that either (a) is Moroccanoil or (b) is made by the same manufacturer (or licensed).  This 
is not to be distinguished from the public merely wondering whether the products are the 
same, or are made by the same manufacturer or are licensed.” 22  
This last section again shares a strong similarity with the likelihood of association within a 
likelihood of confusion in trade mark law because the CJEU in Sabel v. Puma23 demonstrated 
that what was necessary was that there exist a likelihood of confusion on the part of the 
public, a confusion as to the linking of the two economic undertakings signalled by the mark 
and the sign and that a mere association of the sign calling to mind the earlier trade mark was 
not enough on which to base an infringement action.  Overall whilst passing off law focusses 
on misrepresentation and trade mark law is directed at preventing confusion, thus making 
                                                          
22 Moroccanoil Israel Ltd. v. Aldi Stores Ltd. [2014] EWHC 1686 at paragraph 12 
23 Sabel BV v. Puma AG Rudlof Dassler Sport (C-251/95) 
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them different, they both share striking similarities.  It is possibly this that has led to the 
boundaries becoming blurred at times.   
 
Clear Divergence: Initial Interest Confusion 
One area in which the tests for passing off and trade mark infringement diverge is that of 
initial interest confusion, commonly referred to as bait-and-switch or substitution selling.  
This is an emerging area within trade mark law and in part due to its evolutionary nature 
there have been attempts to try and import this into passing off.   Initial interest confusion is 
where a person upon encountering a sign similar to a registered trade mark, is initially 
confused by such use, but this is corrected before the purchase is completed.  It formed one of 
the arguments put forward in OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital24 where the claimant OCH-Ziff, a 
global asset management group, managing numerous alternative investment funds, in other 
words a hedge fund, brought proceedings against OCH Capital a provider of stock broking 
services on an advisory and execution only basis for high net worth individuals or their 
companies and complained of the use by OCH Capital of that name on a sign in its office 
windows in Berkley Street, of “ochcapital” or “ochcapital.co.uk” online and its stylised logo 
and a shield and the words OCH Capital on its letterhead stationery, brochure office windows 
and website.  Counsel for OCH-Ziff argued that there would be initial interest confusion and 
that this ought to be deemed to form part of the confusion rationale within trade mark law.  
On the facts one instance concerned an individual seeing the sign “OCH Capital” in their 
office window in Berkley Street and mistaking it for OCH-Ziff’s premises.  Furthermore 
there was also a high likelihood that internet users typing the word “och” into a search engine 
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would mistakenly click upon the link for OCH Capital’s website by mistake.  Arnold J. did 
accept that initial interest confusion could form part of the confusion rationale within article 
5(1) of Directive 2008/95.  Initial interest confusion derives from U.S. trade mark law and 
during their submission counsel for OCH-Ziff cited a well-known hypothetical example of 
initial interest confusion taken from the U.S. case Brookfield Communications Inc. v. West 
Coast Entertainment Corp.25 The example given involves two video stores, one called West 
Coast and another called Blockbuster.  If Blockbuster were to display a billboard on a 
highway reading “West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7” when West Coast Video is 
located at Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7, customers looking for West Coast 
would turn off at Exit 7, and upon looking for West Coast and being unable to locate it, spy 
Blockbuster and take their custom there instead.  Some customers may even prefer West 
Coast Video but simply cannot find they cannot be bothered to locate it and go to 
Blockbuster.  The customers would know that they were buying from Blockbuster and that it 
was a different store and not economically linked to that enterprise, but nevertheless 
Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast’s acquired goodwill.  Arnold J. remarked 
that 
“...it involves conduct that is something referred to as ‘bait-and-switch’.  That is to say, the 
defendant deliberately uses the claimant’s trade mark as a bait to attract the consumer’s 
attention, and then exploits the opportunity created to switch the consumer’s purchasing 
intention to his own product or service.”26 
 
                                                          
25 Brookfield Communications Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp. 174 F. 3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) 
26 OCH-Ziff Europe v. OCH Capital [2010] EWHC 2599 (Ch.) at paragraph 82 
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Whilst it appears to have been accepted that such initial interest confusion can comprise part 
of the likelihood of confusion within trade mark law and be actionable there remains an 
inability to transfer this across into the law of passing off due to the need for damage to occur 
for there to be a successful claim for the tort.  Recently in Moroccannoil Israel Ltd. v. Aldi 
Stores Ltd.27 an attempt was made to bring initial interest confusion within the scope of 
passing off.  Presumably this would involve aligning it so as to be akin to an initial 
misrepresentation.  This was the argument advanced for the claimant when it was submitted 
that there may be passing off even if the misrepresentation is dispelled by the time of the 
purchase of the defendant’s goods is complete.  OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital was cited as 
authority for this.  However, the alignment with trade mark law is not straightforward and 
instead of there being an overlap there is a clear divergence between the two types of legal 
action.  If one attempts to equate passing off with initial interest confusion or bait-and-switch 
then one has to examine switch selling within passing off.  Wadlow28 discusses switch selling 
citing the classic example of Spalding v. Gamage29.  Here the facts were that reject footballs, 
so-called ‘seconds’, were sold to the public as though they were of ordinary standard.  The 
obvious bait-and-switch here is that the goodwill of Spalding was used to lure the public into 
purchasing footballs that were a substitute for the approved standard goods.  The damage 
caused is obvious as consumers would buy the rejects and if dissatisfied with the quality 
falsely believe that the manufacturers had very low standards and that all of their goods were 
inferior.  This is very different from OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital30.  Wadlow expresses that 
OCH-Ziff v. OCH Capital should not be  
                                                          
27 Moroccanoil Israel Ltd. v. Aldi Stores Ltd. [2014] EWHC 1686 
28 Wadlow, C., The Law of Passing-Off Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation, 4th Edition, (2011), OUP, at 7-
058 to 7-059 
29 Spalding (AG) & Bros. v. A.W. Gamage Ltd. [1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 147 
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“...taken as standing for the proposition that ‘initial interest confusion’ in the trade mark 
sense is sufficient for passing off.  The relevant criterion is not confusion in some abstract 
sense, but misrepresentation, and the misrepresentation must be a material one, in the sense 
of being really likely to cause damage.”31   
Therefore if a customer makes an initial false assumption as to a trade connection between 
the claimant’s and the defendant’s goods and that assumption is dispelled before any 
purchase is made resulting in no damage being caused to the claimant there can be no passing 
off for the element of damage remains one of the key necessities for the tort.  The crux of the 
matter is that with initial interest confusion, or an initial interest misrepresentation, the 
confusion is corrected before being acted upon and that is why there remains a clear 
distinction at this point between passing off and trade mark law.   
 
Conclusion 
Due to the increasing importance of global marketing and creating a brand image built around 
a carefully chosen mark it is sensible practice for many businesses to register their signs as 
trade marks.  An inevitable consequence of this is that when those marks are threatened by 
the actions of third parties the proprietor will seek redress often brining actions under both 
passing off and trade mark law.  Whilst the two actions share many similarities and at key 
points can initially appear to overlap this ought not to blind one to the fact that they are both 
separate doctrines.  In many instances the end result, of a judgement in favour of either 
claimant or defendant, will be the same under both actions but it is not always inevitable for 
                                                          
31 Wadlow, C., The Law of Passing-Off Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation, 4th Edition, (2011), OUP, at 5-
186 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article for publication in the European 
Intellectual Property Review following peer review.  The definitive published version Alice Blythe, 
Misrepresentation, Confusion and The Average Consumer: To What Extent Are The Tests for Passing 
Off and A Likelihood of Confusion Within Trade Mark Law Identical? [2015] E.I.P.R. 484-489 is 
available online on Westlaw UK or from Thompson Reuters DocDel service. 
18 
 
although the two doctrines share many similarities they are not the same.  In the key area of 
initial interest confusion they clearly diverge and if, as predicted, this evolves within trade 
mark law to play an ever increasing role then the points at which both doctrines differ will be 
of great importance in future case law.   
 
